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right in such municipalities to act independently of the state, and the
local authorities cannot be permitted to deterinine for themselves whether
they will contribute through taxation, to the support of the state government, or assist, when called upon to suppress insurrection, on such
subjects the state may exercise compulsory authority. II. That though
muuicipal authorities are made use of in state government, and as such
are under complete state control, they are not created exclusively for
that purpose, but have other objects and purposes purely local, and in
which the state at large, except in conferring the power and regulating
its exercise, is legally no more concerned than it is in the individual
and private concerns of its several citizens. Applying these to the
present case, the court say, that the constitutional pribciple that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law, has
reference to municipal corporations in their! local capacity, and there is
no more constitutional power in the Legislature to dictate to the city of
Detroit at what cost it shall purchase, and how it shall improve and
embellish a park for the recreation and enjoyment of its citizens, than
there is to dictate to an individual what he shall eat, and what he shall
wear. And when a local convenience or need is to be supplied, in
which the people of the State at large, or any portion thereof outside
the city limits, are not concerned, the state can no more by a process of
taxation, take from the individual citizens the money to purchase it,

than it could, if it had already been procured, appropriatd it to the
state's use. And further, that though, when the city of Detroit accepted the Act of 1871, and appointed commissioners to act under it,
such commissioners might possibly be said 'to represent the city, and in
that capacity able to bind it by their acts, the same reason did not apply
when in 1873, the powers of the Commissioners were greatly enlarged,
and their actions were no longer to be submitted to the citizens for approval, in no just. acceptation of the term could they then be said
to be representatives of the city whose interests were to be affected,
without its'consent either express or implied.
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Money paid under .Mistake of Law- Voluntary Payment-Necessity
-Duress.-It is well settled by the current of authority, that where
1 From James B. Black, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 41 Ind. Reports.
2

From Edwin B. Smith, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 61 Me. Reports.
3 From J. Shaaf Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 38 Md. Reports.
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money is paid with a full knowledge of all the facts and circumstances
upon which it is demanded, or with the means of such knowledge, it
cannot be recovered back upon the ground that the party supposed he
was bound in law to pay it, when in truth he was not. Nor can money
voluntarily paid upon demand, though the demand be unjust, be recovered back where the party paying has full knowledge of all the facts.
But if there -be a controlling necessity in the case, arising from the
peculiar circumstances under which the money is demanded, the rule
does not apply. This controlling necessity may arise from duress as
applied to the property, as well as to the person, and where one person
is in possession of the goods or property of another, and refuses to
deliver the same up to that other, unless the latter pays him a sum of
money which he has no right to receive, and the latter, in order to obtain
possession of his property, pays that sum, the money so paid is a payment by compulsion, and may be recovered back. So, if the-property
be not actually in the possession of a person, but he has such control over
it as to give him an undue advantage over another, and money is therefore paid to remove such control, or if thereupon it is agreed between
the parties that if the money is so paid, it shall not be regarded as a
voluntary payment and may be recovered back if the party paying is
otherwise entitled to recover, such recovery may be had: Lafayette and
lizdianapolis Railroad Co. v. Pattison, 41 Ind.
During the rebellion, A. had a contract to furnish the government
with a certain number of beef cattle during two months, and for the
purpose of filling such contract went to Chicago and made a contract
with a railroad company to ship cattle to the city of Indianapolis at
$65 per car; and leaving an agent to ship, he returned to Indianapolis
to receive the cattle. The cattle of the first shipment of two car-loads
were sent to the cattle yard of A., and after a few days a bill for $201.02
was sent to A., which he refused to pay, and infirmed the agent of
the railroad company that he bad a contract for the shipment at $65 per
car; the agent denied knowledge of any such contract, and insisted that
the bills must be paid as presented, and that he would not deliver any
future car-loads of cattle until the freight was paid, as lie made it up •
from the way-bills, and that the bill included other items besides freight,
which he could itemize. It was agreed that A. should pay under
protest, and also future freight, and the cattle should be delivered as
they arrived, and A. should reserve the right to recover any sum so paid
unjustly. In pursuance of this agreement, the agent delivered the cattle
ab the yard of A. as they arrived from time to time, and as soon as the
bills were prepared they were paid by A. Held, that the payments were
not voluntary, and that A. could recover all sums so paid in excess of
his contract price: Id.
APPEARANCE.

A voluntary and general appearance in an action, not only gives
jurisdiction of the parties, but cures any irregularity in the service of
process: Carpentierv. .Minturn et al., 65 Barb.
CANAL.

See ConstitutionalLaw.
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COMMON CARRIER.

When Liaility Ceases-Forwarder.-Where a common carrier takes
goods to forward and deliver, if within his route, if not, to deliver to
the connecting express or a stage at the most convenient point, his liability as a common carrier ceases when the goods arrive at such convenient point of intersection. The common carrier then becomes a ror- warder, and lie ceases to be an insurer of the safety of the goods forwarded: Inhabitants of Plantation No. 4, v. J. Hall et al., 61 Me.
In a suit against such forwarder for negligence, the burden of proof
is on the plaintiff to establish the same: Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Eminent Domain-Legislative Authority-Delcgatfon of Power.The righ of emin.nt domain is inherent in the government. It is not
conferred, but limited by the constitution, and the limit is not upon the
amount of the estate to be taken, but it only requires just compensation.
No property can be taken without legislative authority, and in the manner, and for the purposes, and to the extent authorized. Courts cannot
extend or limit these. The necessity for such condemnation must be
determined by the legislature, and cannot be questioned by the courts.
If the legislature attempt under this power to take property confessedly
not for public use, then the courts may prevent it. Where the state has
taken a fee simple or authorized the taking thereof, and compensated
the owner therefor, the subsequent abandonment of the use will not
reinvest the owner with the title. If simply an casement is taken, the
rule is otherwise. The right of determining the necessity of the work
may be delegated, and courts and juries may be called upon to determinc
as to its necessity: The Water Forks Co. v, Burkhart, 41 Ind.
Canals-Ice.-The legislature of this state authorized its public
agents to appropriate a fee simple in the lands taken for the construction of its canals : 17.
The former owner had rio right to take ice from the canal : Id.
CORPORATION.

Power to wlid Real Estate- Will-Devise of Real Estate to Comnty.
-A
devise of lands in these words: "I give and bequeath unto the
board of commissioners of Kosciusko county, to be appropriated by the
board of commissioners, and their successors in office, fbr the use of
Kosciusko county for ever," &c., vested the absolute title in fee simple
in the lands in the county of Kosciusko, to be managed by the board of
commissioners or such other body or persons as the General Assembly has
provided or may provide to take the place of the board of commissioners: Hlayward v. Davidson, 41 Ind.
With reference to their power to take.and hold real estate, corporations may be classified as follows:1st. Those whose charter, or law of creation, forbids that they should
acquire and hold real estate. Such corporations cannot take and hold
real estate, and a deed or devise to such a corporation can pass no title.
2d. Those whose charter, or law of creation, is silent as to whether
they may or may not acquire and hold real estate. In such a case, if
the objects for which the corporation is formed cannot be accomplished
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without acquiring and holding real estate, the power so to do will be
implied.
3d. Those whose charter, or law of creation, authorizes them, in some
cases, and for some purposes, to take and hold the title to real estate.
4th. Those whose charter, or law of creation, confers upon them a
general power to acquire and hold real estate. Corporations thus empowered may take and hold real estate, as freely, fully, and perfectly as
natural persons may take and hold : Id.
Counties are quasi corporations, and fall within the third class above
given, and in some cases, and for some purposes, are authorized to take
and hold title to real estate. They are expressly empowered to acquire
and hold title to real estate for a location for county buildings and for
a poor-farm, and there may be other instances : Id.
Where a corporation is authorized to acquire and hold title to real estate for some purposes, it cannot be made a question by any party, except the state, whether or not real estate acquired by such corporation
has been acquired for the authorized uses or not: Id.
COUNTY.

See Corporation.

COVENANT.

Legal Tender .Arotes.-A covenant in a lease, by the lessee, to pay
yearly to the lessor, his heirs and assigns for ever, the yearly rent of sixpence sterling for every acre of land 'in current money of the state of
New York, equal in value to money of Great Britain," is not one to pay
rent in money generally, nor is it one that, by its terms, expressly binds
the lessee, his heirs and assigns, to pay the rent in gold or silver coin;
but is a covenant which is not performed by a tender of the same
number of dollars, of the notes of the United States, which the rent
amounts to in dollars, when reckoned at sixpence sterling for every
acre of the leased premises: Stranaglhanv. Youmans, 65 Barb.
The lessor upon such a covenant, is bound to accept the notes of the
United States in payment for the rent, for the reason that by the laws
of Congress such notes are current-money of New York. But if the.
rent is paid in iuch notes, the lessee must pay enough to make the
number of dollars paid equal in value to the same number of dollars
in money of Great Britain, that being what the covenant binds him to
do : Id.
Upon such a covenant, the rent may be paid dollar for dollar in gold
and silver coin of the United States, because such coin is currentmoney of the state of New York: Id
CRIMINAL LAW.

.ftrder-Evidence-Experts.-Whenever the matter of inquiry is
such that inexperienced persons are unlikely to prove capable of forming
a correct judgment upon it; or when it so far partakes of the nature of
a science or trade, as to require a previous habit or experience or study,
in order to the attainment of a knowledge of it, the opinion of experts
is admissible; but if the matter of inquiry be not such as to require
any peculiar habits or study, in order to qualify a person to understand
it, then such evidence is not admissible: Davis v. The State, 38 Md.
On a trial for murder, it was shown that the body of the murdered
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man was discovered in the sink or bin of his mill, with several wounds
on the head, one of which involved a fracture of the skull, and that a
crowbar found in the mill fitted the depression in the skull, caused by
the fracture. Ifeld, That these facts were sufeicnt to lay the foundation for the admissibility of the evidence of medical experts, who from
their knowledge and experience in regard to the nature of wounds, were
better qualified than ordinary persons to form an opinion as to how and
by what means the injuries thus found on' the head of the deceased,
were inflicted : Id.
DAMAGES.
See Husband and Wife.
Wrongful Enlistment of Apprentice.--A negro apprentice, aged about
seventeen years, was enlisted in the army of the United States for three
years, by his master, as a substitute for his son who had been drafted.
The substitute served in the army about fourteen months and was then
discharged; sometime afterward he brought a suit against his former
master to recover damages for loss and injury alleged to have been sustained by having been wrongfully enlisted. At the trial he gave no
evidence to show that he had been injured either in body or mind by
his service in the army, or that he had incurred any expense in consequence of his enlistment. The time of his service in the army was
embraced within the term of his apprenticeship. But as reflecting upon
the quantum of damages which the plaintiff supposed himself entitled
to recover, be proved by a substitute broker what was the price usually
paid for substitutes at the time he, the plaintiff, was enlisted. Held,
That such evidence was inadmissible as furnishing no proper criterion
for assessing damages for any loss sustained by the plaintiff in respect
of either tinme or property for which he could claim to recover: Gent v.
Cole, 38 Md.

DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See Husband and Wife; Payment.
At)propriation f Payments.-lWhenever a defendant is exonerated by
the Statute of Frauds from liability upon his oral promise to pay for
certain goods furnished by the plaintiff to a third person before a certain
date and liable for those furnished afterwards, payments made by him
on the orders of such third person, drawn, payable upon the account
generally, without reference to the question of liability, may be applied
by the creditor to the oldest item : .Jurphy v. Webber, 61 Me.
DEED.

See Equity.

Do-MICIL.

Change of Residence-Intention.-To constitute a change of domicil
there must be a concurrence of the intention to make, and the fact of
making, such change: Parsonsv. Bangor, 61 Me.
On the 30th ofr March, a person, who had previously disposed of the
greater portion of his furniture and his other personal property, paid his
bill at the public-house in Bangor, at which he had been boarding with
his wife for several years, left that city and upon the 1st day of April
arrived at New York, engaged a boarding place and went into business
there in pursuance of an agreement entered into some time before; it
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being arranged that his wife should follow him as soon as a boarding
place was obtained. Held, that such person was not liable to taxation
in Bangor on the 1st day of April: Id.
The acts and intentions of the wiFe do not affect the domicil of the
husband: Id.
DOWER.

ot barred by johibig in Deed as agatinst Attaching Creditor.-Where
a wife joins in a deed with her husband for the purpose of releasing
dower, she will not be barred thereby in a suit for dower, by her, against
a third person who holds the lands by an attachment against the husband
prior to said deed and a levy made afterwards, the tenant having no
estate or claim under such deed: French v. Crosby, 61 Me.
DuREss.

See Action.

EMINENT DOMAIN.

See Constitutional Law.

EQUITY.

Powerof Court to reform Deed of Real Estate.--Where the complainant
bargained one parcel of land, and, by a mistake of both parties, conveyed
another parcel to the respondent, the equitable jurisdiction of this court
will authorize it to reform such deed according to the intention of the
parties, and, by decree, to protect the interests of such persons as may
legally claim to hold the correct premises through and under the respondent: Burr v. -utchinson, 61 Me.
FORMER RECOVERY.

Judgment,when it bars another Suit- Contribution,Right to compel.
-A verdict and judgment rendered in a suit upon a joint and several
note in favor of one surety will not be a bar to another suit against
another surety upon such note, unless it is shown that the first verdict
was rendered upon a defence which would be an extinguishment of the
cause of action ; or unless the grounds of defence set up in both cases
are shown to be identical: Bill v. .iorse, 61 Me.
A surety who has been discharged from his primary liability upon anote, may be held to contribute to reimburse a proportional part thereof
to a co-surety who has been subsequently compelled to pay it: Id.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE.

See Husband and Wife.

HIGHWAYS.

Dedication and Acceptance-Dedicationand acceptance by the public
authorities, create a highway, without regard to the length of time it
may have been used: Chapman v. Swan, 65 Barb.
Estoppel.-Neither recognition nor acquiescence can operate by way
of estoppel, until the expiration of twenty years from the commencement
of the user. When the twenty years have run, the right of the public
is perfect, without regard to the mode in which the acquiescence of the
owner of the land has been manifested : Id.
Obstructions.-Although towns are not obliged to keep the whole of a
highway, from one boundary to the other, free from obstructions and fit
for the use of travellers, the principle cannot apply to the streets of a
village : Wright v. Saunders, 65 Barb.
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No person, whe;her he be owner or not, hds the right to obstruct a
highway, either by placing obstructions, or making excavations therein.
Such obstructions are public nuisances, and may be abated by any person injured thereby. And the person making such obstructions is liable
to the injured party for such damages as may be sustained by reason
thereof: Id.
Digging post-holes in a street is a public nuisance, although it be done
in a part of the street not used, nor susceptible of use by the public, by
reason of natural obstructions therein : Id.
Liabilityfor obstructiny.-When the act done is a nuisance, the liability of the party causing it, for the consequences, follows as a matter
of course, provided the person injured by such act is himself free from
negligence: Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See Domicil; Dower.
When Deed from the Wife to the I1usbantl is iaalid- When Purchaser at a Trustee's Sale will be relieve'd from the Parchase.-A deed
from a married woman of her separate estate, directly to her husband,
is a nullity; and upon the death of the husband, he having survived
his wife, the property will descend to her heirs at law : Preston, Trustee,
v. Furer,38 Md.
Where a trustee sells property under a decree in equity, representing
the title to be indisputable, and the purchaser afterwards discovers thatthe title is defective, the court will, even after the final ratification-of
the sale, on his petition, the purchase-money not having been distributed,
annul the sale, and require the trustee to refund the purchase-money: Id.
Alienation of Real Estate-FrudulentCtnveyance.-A conveyance
of real estate may be made by a husband to his wife without the intervention of trustees, and such conveyance will be upheld unless the
rights of creditors are injuriously affected thereby: Brookbank et Vx.

v. Kennard, 41 Ind.

A husband may convey to his wife a reasonable amount of property,
leaving ample in his hands for the payment of his debts, and -such conveyance will be valid, at least as against future creditors 1 hI.
That a conveyance, executed by a husband directly to his wife, has
not been recorded for a year, and until after the contraction of debts by
the husband, cannot, of itself, render it void : Kd
Measure of Damages in Trespass de bonis asportats-Right of a
MAfarriedl llonal to sue by her Next F'iend.-Where goods belonging to
a married woman in her individual right, being the stock in trade of a
retail tobacco and cigar store carried on by her, are seized and taken
away under an execution against her husband, and- her business is
thereby destroyed, she is entitled, in an action of trespass de bonis asyortatis against the creditor of her husband, and the constable who
levied the execution and took possession of the goods, to recover in
damages fbr such injury as she sustained because of the taking of the
goods and thd breaking up of her business, and the jury may give punitive damages if they find the defendants acted after notice, and
wantonly : Strasburgerv. Barber, 38 Md.
Where the goods of a married woman being her separate estate, and
her stock in trade as proprietor of a retail tobacco and cigar store, are
taken under an execution against her husband, the creditor having
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probable cause to believe, and believing that they were the property of
the husband, and having caused the officer to take the same under a
bonafide claim of title and right under the law, and without any malicious motive or purpose to harass or injure the wife, and the goods are
restored within a short time after their seizure and removal, the measure
of damages in an action of trespass de bonis asportatisagainst the creditor and officer, by the wife, for such seizure and removal, should be restricted to the injury resulting to the plaintiff from the taking, carrying
away and detention of the goods, and the profits which might. have been
made by their sale, and any depreciation in the value thereof in the
interval between the actual levy and removal and their subsequent restoration to the plaintiff: Id.
Under article 45, section 4, of the code of public general laws, a
married woman may, by her next friend, and without her husband joining in the action, sue in trespass de bonis asportatis to recover damages
for the taking and carrying away of her goods and chattels, under an
execution against her husband : 1:.
Witness not competent under the Acts of 1864, ch. 109, and 1868, ch.
116-Legal Presumption of Marriage- When the Tfalidigj of a Foreiqgn
Marriage is recognized in this State-ParticularMarriagewhen asserted,
to be proved affirmatively, &c.-A woman claiming the right as the
widow of a deceased person to administer upon his estate, is not competent under the Act of 1864, ch. 109, as modified by the Act of 1868,
ch. 116, to testify as to the f, ctum of her marriage with the intestate:
Redgrave v. Redgrave, 38 Md.
When parties live together ostensibly as man and wife, demeaning
themselves toward each other as such, and are received into society, and
treated by their friends and relations as having and being entitled to that
status, the law will, in favor of morality and decency, presume that they
have been legally married: d.
Where proof is offered from which a marriage may be inferred, the
presumption is that it was duly and legally contracted according to the
law of the place or country in which it occurred ; and when contracted
in a foreign state or country, the validity of such marriage is recognized'
in this state, although it may not have been attended with the same
formal ceremonies as are required for the celebration of a valid marriage
by the law of Maryland : Id.
Where, upon a question of marriage, a person assumes to prove that a
valid marriage was celebrated on a particular occasion as testified to by
a party to the transaction, it is incumbent upon the person asserting
such marriage, to show affirmatively that it was in all respects in conformity to law; and failing in this, he will not be permitted to rely
upon other facts and circumstances of the case as the ground of a presumption, that a marriage may have taken place between the parties on
some other and different occasion from that spoken of by the witness: Id.
INSURANCE.

Agent- Who is-Insurance 'upon open Policy - When effected.When an insurance company issues to a person an open policy, with
blanks therein for the endorsement of risks agreed upon by him and
blank certificates for the description of the risks thus agreed upon to be
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signed by him, with nithority to take the premiums, he is to be deemed
an agent of the company: Wass v. Mfaine Matual Marine Insurance Co.,
61 Mc.
When an open policy is issued " on property on board vessel or vessels, at and frn port or ports in the United States and foreign countries, with such other risks as may be agreed on, as per endorsement
hereon, accepted by the company," and the risk is agreed upon, the
premini paid, and the endorsement thereof made by the agent, the insurance is effected: Id.
LN.A hso',raLce-Cbnlrction of the Statutes relating to the di.osi6a (if .Xoneys arisiny therifrom.-One who dies insolvent can make
no testamentary disposition of the fund accruing from an insurance
policy upon his life if he leaves neither widow'nor child; in such event,
the insurance-money becomes assets for the payment of debts : Jathaway7 v. Sherman, 61 Me.

A person having an insurance upon his life, dying insolvent, leaving
a widow and children, may bequeath the insurance-money among them
as he pleases; but le cannot bestow it by will upon any other persons.
The power to dispose of such fund by will, conferred by R. S., c. 75, §
10, is limited, in case of insolvency, to a disposition among the widow
and children of the deceased : .el.
An intention on the part of a testator, by his will, to dispose of the
fund arising from an insurance policy upon his life, will not be inferred
from the fict that his bequests were ultimately found to exceed the
whale amount of his estate exclusive of this fund; nor from the fact
that he designated a person as the legatee of the residue of his property
of every description whatsoever. 11The testator's intention to change
the direction which the law gives to this very peculiar species of property is not to be inferred from general provisions in his will, the fulfilment of which might require the use of such money, but must be explicitly declared:" Id.
INTEREST.

When the vendee, in a contract for the purchase and sale of real
estate, takes possession of the property as owner, without having paid
the purchase-money, he is bound to pay interest: Parkerv. Parker,65
Barb.
JUDGMENT.
See Former Recovery. Set-Off.
A judgment may be assailed collaterallly for fraud, by persons not
parties to it, or privies who are injured by it. Thus it is competent for
a creditor to assail collaterally a judgment against his debtor for that
cause: Spicer et al. v. lVaters, 65 Barb.
JURISDICTION.

It is too late to raise an objection to the jurisdiction of the court.,
after an unqualified appearance in the action: Car
mentier et al. v. Minturn et al., 65 Barb.
Sufficient is shown to sustain the action when it appears that the court
has general jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and the parties have
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court: 17.
LEGAL TENDER NOTES.
MARRIAGE.

See Covenant.

See Husband and Wife.
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MORTGAGE.
Sale by Mortgagc-Iaadequac/ (if Pricc-A 'gigee's Sale set
aside--Dties of a Mltortgayee sdling the fhortgaged 1"operty.-A
sale in all other respects unobjectionable, will not be set aside for inadequacy of price, unless the sum reported be so grossly inadequate as
to indicate a want of reasonable judgment and discretion in the trustee:
Md.
Hlorsey v. tHough, 38
The duties of a mortgagee in selling the mortgaged property under a
power contained in the mortgage, are analogous to those of a trustee
under a decree; and the court will determine upon the propriety of the
sale reported by the mortgagee, as in the ease of an ordinary trustee,
exercising towards the former, however, greater care and strictness;
more especially when he has reported himself as the purchaser at a great
depreciation : V1.
NEGLIGENCE.

Pleading-Railroad.-Acomplaint seeking a recovery from a railroad company on the ground of negligence in running a train of cars:
whereby the plaintiff has been injured, must expressly allege that the
injury occurred without the fault or negligence of the plaintiff, or it
must clearly appear from the facts which are alleged that such must
have been the case : Afaxfield v. . I & L. Railroad Co., 41 Ind.
OFFICER.
Permit-Rihts of Assignee under-Delivery-Sale on Aesne Process
-Notice of.-An assignment of' a permit to cut timber transfers to
the assignee the trees afterwards cut under it, so as to enable him to
maintain an action of trespass against an officer attaching the lumber
as the property of the assignor: ,S.wyer v. Wilson, 61 Me.
An officer who sells attached property upon mesne process, without
giving the notice required by law, becomes a trespasser ab initio, and
will not be permitted to show in defence of a suit against him that the
conveyance of the attached property by the debtor named in such process to the party suing the officer was fraudulent and void as to creditors: 2d.
A notice of a sale of goods taken and appraised on mesne process.
defective for want of sufficient time, is not cured by a postponement of
the sale on the day appointed iherefor to one remote enough to answer
the statute requirement. The officer cannot make a valid sale at the
adjournment that would be invalid if made on the day originally designated : Id.
PAYMENT.

.Agreement to extend Tine.-To render an agreement to extend the time
of payment of a note, or other demand valid, it must be supported by
a good consideration: 3.farcellns v. Countrymen, 65 Barb.
Mistake or Ignorance of Facts-Rescinding Contract.-Where debtors give to their creditor, in full payment and discharge of the debt,
the promissory note of third persons, who had previously fitiled and become insolvent, though that fact was unknown to the parties at the time
of the transfer, the creditors may rescind the contract, unless it appears that he agreed to receive the note in payment whether the
makers had failed or not: Roberts v. Fisher, 65 Barb.
There is no doubt of such a rule being well settled law in the caso
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of bank-bills, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in Roberts v.
Fisher, (43 N. Y. 159,) must be regarded as applying the same rule to
promissory otes: Id.
Where it appears from the whole evidence that both parties were
acting in ignorance of the failure of the makers, this gives the creditors
the right to rescind the contract on discovery of the mistake: Id.
PLEADING.

See Negligence; Set-Of.
RECEIPT.

A receipt for government bonds, which describes them by their numbers and amounts, and in which it is stated: "These bonds we hold
subject to the order of J. L. P., at ten days' notice, agreeing to collect
the coupons for his account free of charge, and to allow him 2 per cent.
per annum interest on the par value of said bonds." &c., makes it the
duty of the signer to return the same bonds received by him on ten
dayss' notice : Palmer v. Iussey, 65 Barb.
He is bound to protect the bonds and to return them on demand, and
his refusal to do so is a conversion for which he is liable, and may be
arrested : Id.
SALE.

See Vendor.

Sale by Agent-E§ect of.-When a commission merchant sells and
delivers property, intrusted to him for sale, before notice of the revocation of his authority, he is not liable in .trover for such sale: Jones v.
Hodgkins, 61 Me.
The bond fide purchaser under such sale and delivery acquires thereby
a good -title as against a prior purchaser from the consignor without
delivery : Al.
SET-OFF.

Jiuigments.-The fact that judgments are rendered in different courts
does not prevent either party from having the one set off against the
other: Brooks v. Harris,41 Ind.
There must be mutuality in the claims, in order that they may be set
off against each other; but where a judgment has been obtained on the
relation of A. against B. and his sureties on a constable's bond, B. may
have a judgment obtained by him against A. set off against the judgment on the bond : d.
A judgment is not a written instrument within the meaning of the
statute requiring copies of written instruments in pleading: Md.
Although an equitable title to the judgment has been acquired by a
stranger before The motion is made by the judgment defendant to have
it satisfied by being set off against another judgment, yet the legal title
will control the equity and authorize the satisfaction : d.
STATUTE.

Repeal by Implication.-The law does not favor the repeal of statutes
by implication, and when courts hold that a statute or any provision
thereof is repealed by implication, it is done in obedience to the legislative will as manifested in the act. It niust appear that the subsequent
statute revised the whole subject-matter of the former one, and w:,s
evidently intended as a substitute for it, or that it was repugnant to the
old law: Water Works Co. v. Burkhart, 41 Ind.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

TRESPASS.
TROVER.

263.

See Husband and Wife.
See Receipt; Sale.

TRUSTEE. See Husband and Wife; Mortgage.
TRIAL.
Practice-A Party having objected to the Admissibility of Evidence
will vot be heard to object to its withdrawalfrom the Jur~y-Power of
the Court as to its. Instructions to the Jury-Appeal.-In the trial of a
cause the defendant objected to the admissibility of certain evidence
offered by the plaintiff; the court overruled the objection, and the
plaintiff thereupon waived the testimony and proposed to withdraw it
from the consideration of the jury, which the court allowed him to do.
The defendant excepted. Held, That the defendant after objecting to
the admissibility of the evidence could not be heard to object to its
being voluntarily waived, and withdrawn from the consideration of the
jury : Sittig v. Birkestack, 38 Md.
The court has the power at any time during the trial of a cause, to
modify its instructions to the jury, or to revoke them entirely, if upon
reflection, it is considered that they have been erroneously given : Id.
A party to a cause after excepting to an instruction as erroneous, will
not be heard to complain because it was afterwards revoked and withdrawn from the jury: Id.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER. See Sale.
Bond fide Purchaser.-A bongfide purchaser is one who buys property
of another without notice, that some third person has a right to, or interest in such property, and pays a full and fair price for the same, at
the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of such other in the property: Spicer et al. v. Waters, 65 Barb.
To constitute one a bond fide purchaser, it is not enough to show a
conveyance good in form, but payment of the consideration must be
made out. It must be actually paid; not merely secured to be paid : Id.
If the title of a purchaser is void. as against the creditors of his
vendor, by reason of fraud, that defect attaches to the title of every
subsequent purchaser who is not a bond fide purchaser without notice:
id.
Rights of subsequent Purchasers.-When the owner of personal
property makes an unconditional delivery to his vendee, with the intent
to transfer the title, a subsequent bond fide purchaser from such vendee
acquires a valid title, although the owner was induced to sell by the
fraud of his vendee; and it is only after actual delivery to the fraudulent vendee, that a bond fide purchaser could rely upon the apparent
ownership which the possession of the fraudulent vendee indicates, and
thereby get a good title from him: Bernard et al. v. Camipbell et al.,
65 Barb.
It is only upon the principle that the rightful owner of property is
estopped from asserting his right when his act of conferring upon his
vendee the possession has led to the payment by an innocent purchaser,
that a bond fide purchaser can be protected. The doctrine has never
been extended so far as to protect a purchaser when advancing the consideration to some one who did not at the time hold the property, or the
indicia -f its title: Id.

